Strategic Interactions between Tax and Statutory Auditors and Different Information Regimes: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency

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dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/9784
dc.identifier.uri https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/9841
dc.contributor.author Blaufus, Kay
dc.contributor.author Schöndube, Jens Robert
dc.contributor.author Wielenberg, Stefan
dc.date.accessioned 2020-04-17T14:12:06Z
dc.date.available 2020-04-17T14:12:06Z
dc.date.issued 2020
dc.identifier.citation Blaufus, Kay; Schöndube, Jens Robert; Wielenberg, Stefan: Strategic Interactions between Tax and Statutory Auditors and Different Information Regimes: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency. Hannover : Institutionelles Repositorium der Leibniz Universität Hannover, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15488/9784
dc.description.abstract We examine whether tax audits become more efficient if tax auditors have access to audited financial statements and information about statutory audit adjustments. We extend the standard tax compliance game by a statutory auditor to analyze the strategic interactions among a firm issuing financial and tax reports, a statutory auditor, and a tax auditor. For medium-powered tax auditor incentives and firms that place a high weight on book income, we show that granting the tax auditor access to information on statutory audit adjustments increases firms’ tax compliance, raises tax revenues, and decreases tax audit frequency. Thus more information sharing between statutory and tax auditors could be an important but so far overlooked policy instrument to combat tax evasion and increase tax audit efficiency. However, we also highlight the limitations of this approach. The efficiency effect of information sharing turns out to be ambiguous in many constellations and depends on the strength of tax auditor incentives and the weight that firms place on book income. eng
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Hannover : Institutionelles Repositorium der Leibniz Universität Hannover
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 DE
dc.rights.uri https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/de/
dc.subject Tax compliance game eng
dc.subject Tax audit eng
dc.subject Statutory audit eng
dc.subject Tax audit efficiency eng
dc.subject Strategic auditing eng
dc.subject.ddc 330 | Wirtschaft
dc.title Strategic Interactions between Tax and Statutory Auditors and Different Information Regimes: Implications for Tax Audit Efficiency eng
dc.type report
dc.type Text
dc.description.version publishedVersion
tib.accessRights frei zug�nglich


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