dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/5199 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/5246 |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Schöndube, Jens Robert
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2019-08-15T11:13:37Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2019-08-15T11:13:37Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2017 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Schöndube-Pirchegger, Barbara; Schöndube, Jens Robert: Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment. In: Business Research 10 (2017), Nr. 2, S. 189-213. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40685-017-0050-2 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
We consider a two-period LEN-type agency problem. The principal needs to implement one out of two accounting systems. One emphasizes relevance, the other reliability. Both systems produce identical inter-temporally correlated signals. The relevant system reports an accounting signal in the period in which it is produced. The reliable system reports a more precise signal, but with a one period delay. Accounting information is contractible only if it is reported within the two-period horizon of the game. Accordingly, accounting information produced in the second period becomes uncontractible with the reliable system in place. Non-accounting information needs to be used for contracting to provide any second period incentives at all. We derive optimal compensation contracts in a full and in a limited commitment setting. With full commitment, the reliable system trades-off more precise first and less precise second-period contractible information, as compared to the relevant system. If the reduction of noise in the accounting signals is strong and the distortion in the non-accounting measure is weak, the reliable system is preferred. With limited commitment we identify a similar trade-off if intertemporal correlation of the signals is negative. If it is positive, this trade-off might reverse: The reliable system is possibly preferred if noise reduction is small and the non-accounting measure is heavily distorted. Noisiness in performance measures then serves as a commitment device. It reduces otherwise overly high powered incentives and thus benefits the principal. |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
Heidelberg : Springer |
|
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Business Research 10 (2017), Nr. 2 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 4.0 Unported |
|
dc.rights.uri |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
|
dc.subject |
Distortion |
eng |
dc.subject |
Throughput accounting |
eng |
dc.subject |
Economics |
eng |
dc.subject |
Accounting information system |
eng |
dc.subject |
Contractible space |
eng |
dc.subject |
Principal–agent problem |
eng |
dc.subject |
Commitment device |
eng |
dc.subject |
Incentive |
eng |
dc.subject |
Welfare economics |
eng |
dc.subject |
Information needs |
eng |
dc.subject.ddc |
330 | Wirtschaft
|
ger |
dc.title |
Relevance versus reliability of accounting information with unlimited and limited commitment |
|
dc.type |
Article |
|
dc.type |
Text |
|
dc.relation.issn |
2198-3402 |
|
dc.relation.doi |
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40685-017-0050-2 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.issue |
2 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume |
10 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage |
189 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.lastPage |
213 |
|
dc.description.version |
publishedVersion |
|
tib.accessRights |
frei zug�nglich |
|