Risk vs Reward strategies in indirect presidential elections: Political parties and the selection of presidential electors in Germany, 1949-2017

Show simple item record

dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/4538
dc.identifier.uri https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/4580
dc.contributor.author Köker, Philipp ger
dc.date.accessioned 2019-03-12T08:56:50Z
dc.date.issued 2019-03-11
dc.identifier.citation Köker, P.: Risk vs Reward Strategies in Indirect Presidential Elections: Political Parties and the Selection of Presidential Electors in Germany, 1949–2017. In: German Politics (2019), accepted. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2019.1590549 ger
dc.description.abstract Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties’ ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949-2017, the analysis shows that – contrary to traditional assumptions – competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in German Politics (2019) © Taylor & Francis. ger
dc.language.iso eng ger
dc.publisher Milton Park, UK : Taylor & Francis
dc.relation.ispartofseries German Politics ger
dc.relation.requires https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.6263060.v1
dc.rights Es gilt deutsches Urheberrecht. Das Dokument darf zum eigenen Gebrauch kostenfrei genutzt, aber nicht im Internet bereitgestellt oder an Außenstehende weitergegeben werden. ger
dc.subject electoral college eng
dc.subject Federal President eng
dc.subject Germany eng
dc.subject party strategy eng
dc.subject presidential election eng
dc.subject Bundespräsident ger
dc.subject Bundesversammlung ger
dc.subject Präsidentschaftswahlen ger
dc.subject Wahlmänner ger
dc.subject Wahlfrauen ger
dc.subject Große Koalition ger
dc.subject.ddc 320 | Politik ger
dc.title Risk vs Reward strategies in indirect presidential elections: Political parties and the selection of presidential electors in Germany, 1949-2017 ger
dc.type article ger
dc.type Text ger
dc.relation.essn 1743-8993
dc.relation.issn 0964-4008
dc.relation.doi 10.1080/09644008.2019.1590549
dc.description.version acceptedVersion ger
tib.accessRights Verlagsembargo bis zum 2020-09-12, danach frei zug�nglich ger


Files in this item

Due to a publishing embargo this file is blocked up to and including 2020-09-12 .

This item appears in the following Collection(s):

Show simple item record

 

Search the repository


Browse

My Account

Usage Statistics