Public Disclosure of Tax Strategies and Firm’s Actual Tax Policy

Abstract

We use a sample of 248 tax strategies published by U.K. companies listed on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 and FTSE 250 to examine (a) how companies present themselves—more as “responsible taxpayers” who view taxes as a meaningful contribution to society, or more as “tax planners” who view taxes primarily as a cost, and (b) whether these presentations correspond to actual tax avoidance behavior. Our results show that, on average, firms tend to portray themselves as “responsible taxpayers,” but that this portrayal is consistent with firms’ tax avoidance behavior only when firms are subject to above-average external monitoring by financial analysts. The results suggest that firms manage the content of qualitative tax disclosures to sway public opinion as long as the probability of detecting misstatements is sufficiently low. This raises doubts as to whether mandatory qualitative information provides added value for stakeholders if it is not under external review. JEL Classification: H25; H20; M40; M48.