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Originalpublikation
Reydon, T.A.C.; Ereshefsky, M.: How to Incorporate Non-Epistemic Values into a Theory of Classification. In: European journal for philosophy of science 12 (2022), Nr. 1, 4. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00438-6
Version im Repositorium
Zum Zitieren der Version im Repositorium verwenden Sie bitte diesen DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15488/12975
| Zusammenfassung: | |
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Non-epistemic values play important roles in classificatory practice, such that philosophical accounts of kinds and classification should be able to accommodate them. Available accounts fail to do so, however. Our aim is to fill this lacuna by showing how non-epistemic values feature in scientific classification, and how they can be incorporated into a philosophical theory of classification and kinds. To achieve this, we present a novel account of kinds and classification (the Grounded Functionality Account), discuss examples from biological classification where non-epistemic values play decisive roles, and show how this account accommodates the role of non-epistemic values. © 2022, The Author(s).
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| Lizenzbestimmungen: | CC BY 4.0 Unported - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
| Publikationstyp: | Article |
| Publikationsstatus: | publishedVersion |
| Erstveröffentlichung: | 2022 |
| Schlagwörter (englisch): | GFA, Grounded functionality account of natural kinds, Natural kinds, Non-epistemic values, Values |
| Fachliche Zuordnung (DDC): | 100 | Philosophie, 500 | Naturwissenschaften |
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