dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/12576 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/12676 |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Aduini, Fernando
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Nateghi, Arash
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Schaarschmidt, Martin
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Lanzrath, Marian
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Suhrke, Michael
|
|
dc.contributor.editor |
Garbe, Heyno
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2022-08-04T06:49:34Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2022-08-04T06:49:34Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2022 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Aduini, Fernando; Nateghi, Arash; Schaarschmidt, Martin; Lanzrath, Marian; Suhrke, Michael: IEMI Vulnerability Analysis for Different Smart Grid-enabled Devices. In: Garbe, H. (Ed.): Proceedings EMV Kongress 2022. Aachen : Apprimus, 2022, S. 193-200 |
ger |
dc.description.abstract |
The smart grid concept aims to improve power systems’ robustness, efficiency, and reliability. The
transition from conventional power grids to smart grids has been achieved mainly by integrating
Smart Electronic Devices (SEDs) and advanced automatic control and communication systems.
On the one hand, electronic devices have been integrated to make the system more decentralised
from the national electrical grid. On the other hand, from the point of view of protection and control
equipment, there is a growing tendency to replace arrays of analog devices with single digital
units that perform multiple functions in a more integrated and efficient way. Despite the perceived
benefits of such modernisation, security issues have arisen with substantial concern as electronic
devices can be susceptible to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) [2].
The number of IEMI sources has grown significantly in recent decades. In 2014, 76 different types
were reported, in which 21 sources were conducted, and 55 were irradiated. From a technical
perspective, they can present different features, including band type, average / centre frequency,
peak voltage (for conducted sources), or peak field (for irradiated sources) [4]. These sources
also differ in technology level, associated cost, and mobility in approaching the target system.
Therefore, they can be characterized by the easiness of occurrence in a given scenario and the
increased probability of successful attacks on a target system. Under this perspective, a self-built
jammer built with off-the-shelf components is more likely to be employed by an offender than a
High-Power Electromagnetic (HPEM) source. On the other hand, despite being less probable on
account of higher technological level, cost and mobility, a HPEM source may have a higher success
rate to affect the target system than the self-built jammer. Coupled with this, based on the different
characteristics of the IEMI sources, the electronic devices may present distinct effects, which may
trigger severe impacts on a smart grid at a higher level [8]. Therefore, this study compares the IEMI vulnerability of three devices used in smart grid applications.
The first device is a Wi-Fi-based smart home meter. It can read voltage and current signals
of consumer units and remotely display real power, reactive power, and power factor. These measurements
can be used in-house or transmitted to a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) system from Distribution System Operators (DSOs). The second device is a Power Line
Communication (PLC) unit, which enables data to be carried over conductors intended primarily for
electrical power transmission. This technology is used in buildings to reduce the communication
network’s material and installation costs and provide flexibility and faster data communication. The
final device considered is a digital protection relay designed to trip circuit breakers when faults are
detected. The latest digital relay units feature many protection functionalities, including overload
and under-voltage/over-voltage protection, temperature monitoring, fault location, self-reclosure,
among others. The three devices are subjected to self-built low-power jamming signals. As an
extension, the protection relay is also subjected to a narrowband High Power Electromagnetic
(HPEM) source. |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
Aachen : Apprimus |
|
dc.relation.ispartof |
https://doi.org/10.15488/12553 |
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dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 DE |
|
dc.rights.uri |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/de/ |
|
dc.subject |
EMV |
ger |
dc.subject |
Verträglichkeit |
ger |
dc.subject |
Elektromagnetik |
ger |
dc.subject.classification |
Konferenzschrift |
ger |
dc.subject.ddc |
600 | Technik
|
ger |
dc.subject.ddc |
621,3 | Elektrotechnik, Elektronik
|
ger |
dc.title |
IEMI Vulnerability Analysis for Different Smart Grid-enabled Devices |
eng |
dc.type |
BookPart |
|
dc.type |
Text |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage |
193 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.lastPage |
200 |
|
dc.description.version |
publishedVersion |
|
tib.accessRights |
frei zug�nglich |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.bookTitle |
Proceedings EMV Kongress 2022 : Internationale Fachmesse und Kongress für Elektromagnetische Verträglichkeit |
|