This dissertation comprises four articles concerning tax evasion and tax avoidance. Thefirst study investigates if a one set of books transfer pricing strategy can be part of a multinational’sequilibrium strategy even though two sets of books provide an additional degreeof freedom when transfer pricing is used for tax reporting and internal decision making.Using a game theoretic model the article shows that the penalty difference between thetransfer pricing regimes in case of a detected non-compliant transfer price critically affectswhether the multinational uses one set or two sets of books. Furthermore, the study showsthat an increasing tax rate differential induces less tax-aggressiveness because high profitshifting incentives are anticipated by a strategic tax auditor.The second article analyzes transfer pricing of an intangible while endogenizing itslocation choice. Multinationals are often suspected of using transfer pricing of intangiblesto shift profits from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. However, if spillovers from the useof the intangible are prevalent and the multinational faces a trade-off between spilloverinternalization and tax minimization a ’home bias’ might occur. In particular, for a highspillover and restrictions on tax avoidance, the intangible is optimally located in theheadquarters which is in the high-tax country even though tax savings could be realizedby locating the intangible in an offshore division. Additionally, the study shows thatcurtailing profit shifting possibilities can harm investment incentives.The third article investigates the interdependence between a firm’s tax reporting andinvestment behavior if the financial statement provides a noisy signal regarding the correcttax treatment of the project to a strategically acting tax authority. The study showsthat the expected tax revenue for the tax authority can either increase or decrease withincreasing book-tax conformity. Increasing book-tax conformity is detrimental for theinvestment incentives but leads to less understated non-conforming tax reports.The fourth article examines how taxes and the transfer pricing regulation affect thecapacity planning of a multinational company. In a situation where tight regulation curbsthe reporting discretion, multinationals can shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions by adaptingreal decisions instead of manipulating the transfer price. The article shows that taxesand transfer pricing regulation increase the probability of excessive capacity. Therefore,taxes and corresponding regulation are identified as potential antecedents for organizationalslack.