This PhD thesis studies the implications of local governance, decentralisation and regional autonomy under federalism. Furthermore, it contributes to the trade literature by bringing together the largely separated research on cartel behaviour and anti-dumping policy. More explicitly, this thesis identifies empirically that the implementation of communal mergers, regional autonomy and anti-dumping policy leads to unexpected outcomes. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1945-1991 as a case to study the local implications of communal mergers and of the decentralisation of government functions. Chapter 4 combines the largest databases on anti-dumping and antitrust cases to study the relationship of global cartels and anti-dumping laws. In response to policy-makers, this thesis argues that it is an illusion to expect that communal mergers only improve governance efficiency, that it is an illusion to expect federalism to more accurately reflect preferences of local populations, and that it is an illusion to expect that anti-dumping policy only protects competitive markets.