This dissertation consists of four empirical studies analyzing corporate tax disclosure and several aspects of tax compliance management systems, also known as tax control frameworks. The first study examines whether the content of published tax strategies of UK firms relates to their actual tax policy or whether the firms use strategic reporting aimed at avoiding information or even misinforming stakeholders. The results show, among other things, that firms disclose strategically and external monitoring of firms significantly limits their strategic reporting. The second study examines how firms react when they perceive an increase in aggressive behavior of the tax authority. The results show that companies respond to this perceived behavior by, among other things, improving the quality of their tax control framework. However, we find no adjustment of the resources allocated to their tax planning activities. The third study examines the validity and determinants of this validity of tax compliance management systems in a sample of German small and medium-sized enterprises. The results show that the quality of tax compliance management systems varies considerably across the sample and that the size of the tax department has a significant influence on this validity. The fourth study examines the disclosure of tax compliance and tax risks by German listed companies. The results show that the tax compliance disclosure is not very specific and that the conditional likelihood of first-time tax compliance disclosure is mainly driven by the application decree of Section 153 German fiscal code. The results also show that reporting on tax risks is also very heterogeneous and that companies with higher tax risks disclose significantly less on their tax risks.