dc.identifier.uri |
https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/14235 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://doi.org/10.15488/14121 |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Koessler, Ann-Kathrin
|
eng |
dc.contributor.author |
Torgler, Benno
|
eng |
dc.contributor.author |
Feld, Lars P.
|
eng |
dc.contributor.author |
Frey, Bruno S.
|
eng |
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-08-02T15:45:20Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-08-02T15:45:20Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2019-03-01 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Koessler, A.K.; Torgler, B.; Feld, L.P.; Frey, B.S.: Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments. In: European Economic Review 115 (2019), S. 78-98. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.02.006 |
eng |
dc.description.abstract |
A tax authority’s ability to successfully collect taxes depends on its relationship with the taxpayers as well as their commitment to contribute to the common good. In this paper, we examine the effect of promises on tax compliance aimed at fostering taxpayer commit- ment. First, in a field experiment, we investigate whether tax compliance changes when taxpayers make a formal promise to pay their taxes on time with compliance rewarded by entry into a lottery for either a financial or nonfinancial (in-kind) reward. We then complement this analysis with a laboratory experiment in which we measure the effect of promises in the different compliance domain of tax honesty and contrast the effect of a pure promise to pay with schemes that pair the promise with a reward offer. We find that taxpayers with a history of compliance or high scores on tax morale are more likely to make the promise, but solely offering the possibility to make a promise does not lead to a change in compliance behavior. Whether or not compliance improves depends on the type of reward to which the promise is linked. In our experimental analyses, for example, compliance only increases if the reward for promise fulfillment is nonfinancial. |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Amsterdam : Elsevier |
|
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
European Economic Review 115 (2019) |
eng |
dc.rights |
Es gilt deutsches Urheberrecht. Das Dokument darf zum eigenen Gebrauch kostenfrei genutzt, aber nicht im Internet bereitgestellt oder an Außenstehende weitergegeben werden. |
eng |
dc.rights.uri |
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Unported |
eng |
dc.rights.uri |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
|
dc.subject |
Tax compliance Field experiment Commitment Promise Supportive incentives Psychological tax contract |
eng |
dc.subject |
Field experiment |
eng |
dc.subject |
Commitment |
eng |
dc.subject |
Promise |
eng |
dc.subject |
Supportive incentives |
eng |
dc.subject |
Psychological tax contract |
eng |
dc.subject.ddc |
330 | Wirtschaft
|
eng |
dc.subject.ddc |
300 | Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
|
eng |
dc.title |
Commitment to pay taxes: Results from field and laboratory experiments |
eng |
dc.type |
Article |
eng |
dc.type |
Text |
eng |
dc.relation.essn |
1873-572X |
|
dc.relation.issn |
0014-2921 |
|
dc.relation.doi |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.02.006 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume |
115 |
eng |
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage |
78 |
eng |
dc.bibliographicCitation.lastPage |
98 |
eng |
dc.description.version |
acceptedVersion |
eng |
tib.accessRights |
frei zug�nglich |
eng |
dc.bibliographicCitation.journalTitle |
European Economic Review |
eng |