dc.identifier.uri |
http://dx.doi.org/10.15488/12488 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
https://www.repo.uni-hannover.de/handle/123456789/12587 |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Bannikova, Marina
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Jelnov, Artyom
|
|
dc.contributor.author |
Jelnov, Pavel
|
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2022-07-15T05:04:15Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2022-07-15T05:04:15Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2021 |
|
dc.identifier.citation |
Bannikova, M.; Jelnov, A.; Jelnov, P.: The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures. In: Games 12 (2021), Nr. 4, 76. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040076 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies. © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. |
eng |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
|
dc.publisher |
Basel : MDPI AG |
|
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Games 12 (2021), Nr. 4 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 4.0 Unported |
|
dc.rights.uri |
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
|
dc.subject |
Legislature |
eng |
dc.subject |
Lobbyist |
eng |
dc.subject |
Parties |
eng |
dc.subject |
Voting |
eng |
dc.subject.ddc |
510 | Mathematik
|
ger |
dc.title |
The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures |
|
dc.type |
Article |
|
dc.type |
Text |
|
dc.relation.essn |
2073-4336 |
|
dc.relation.doi |
https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040076 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.issue |
4 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.volume |
12 |
|
dc.bibliographicCitation.firstPage |
76 |
|
dc.description.version |
publishedVersion |
|
tib.accessRights |
frei zug�nglich |
|