In this dissertation, I provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of impediments to the independence and objectivity of the overall state of research. I argue that we need a new approach beyond existing conceptions of scientific objectivity. This is because—when concerned with states of research—not only do we have to account for problems with individual findings but also with imbalance, that is the neglect or overabundance of specific types of research relative to others. In the first of the three parts of the dissertation, I define the concept “state of research”, and introduce the idea of its imbalance. The latter concept is based on a discussion of various examples from the literature. In the second part, I analyze three major concepts that can help explain why these cases can and should be considered problems for the independence and objectivity of science: epistemic trustworthiness, productiveness, and justice. These three normative criteria and their interrelations form the general structure of the conceptual framework. In the third part, I operationalize the criteria to show that and how they can be applied to the cases introduced in the first part, and present the results. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for higher-order concepts such as bias, the independence of science, and objectivity. I argue that when we look at the application of these concepts to the state of research, in addition to purely epistemic considerations, we also have to emphasize the social responsibility of science.
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